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A POISONED ARROW IN HIS QUIVER: WHY FORBIDDING 
AN ENTIRE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT FROM 
COMMUNICATING WITH A REPORTER VIOLATES THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
"[There exists} a profound national commitment 
to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it 
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and 
public officials. ,,1 
"Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a 
newspaper. Truth itself becomes suspicious by 
being put into that polluted vehicle. ,,2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In November 2004, Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., issued a 
directive to all officials and employees in Maryland's State 
Executive Department commanding them to stop communicating 
with two Baltimore Sun reporters, David Nitkin and Michael 
Olesker. 3 Governor Ehrlich's stated rationale for the ban against 
the two reporters was that they were "failing to objectively report 
on any issue dealing with the Ehrlich-Steele Administration.,,4 
After the ban was implemented, each reporter learned Executive 
Department officials no longer were willing to speak with them. 
The two reporters and the Baltimore Sun collectively challenged 
the Governor's ban in federal court, claiming that it infringed upon 
their First Amendment rights of free expression and freedom of the 
press. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland 
dismissed the Baltimore Sun's complaint for failure to state a 
claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed. 5 
This Comment analyzes the District Court and Fourth Circuit 
opinions in Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich6 ("The Sun case"), and 
explains why these courts erred in upholding the Governor's ban. 
Although there is no general right of access to government 
information under the First Amendment, and no public official is 
I. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
2. JAMES B. LEMERT, CRITICIZING THE MEDIA 9 (1989) (excerpt of letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to J. Norvell (1807)). 
3. BaIt. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 437 F .3d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 2006). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. 437 F.3d 410. 
135 
136 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 36 
obligated to speak to any member of the press, this does not mean 
government can. manipulate the dissemination of government 
information to reporters in a manner that chills speech. 7 
There are two main flaws in the District Court's and Fourth 
Circuit's analysis of the Governor's ban. First, neither court 
acknowledged that the Governor's ban is viewpoint-based, and, as 
a result, neither court addressed the perilous effects of viewpoint-
based restrictions in restraining ideas and opinions from entering 
the "marketplace of ideas."g Second, neither court evaluated the 
Governor's ban as overarching policy. The Fourth Circuit opined 
there is no distinction between the hypothetical scenario of one 
public official refusing to speak to a reporter on account of what 
that reporter had written in the past, and the Governor's ban. The 
distinction is that one public official refusing to speak to a reporter 
does not eliminate that reporter's ability to communicate with any 
other public official or employee in the Executive Department, 
whereas, the Governor's ban forbids the entire Executive 
Department from communicating with Nitkin and Olesker. By not 
evaluating the Governor's ban as broad overarching policy, the 
Fourth Circuit did not properly assess the potential chilling effect 
of the Governor's ban. 
Part II of this Comment provides further factual background 
about The Sun case, and summarizes the District Court and Fourth 
Circuit opinions. Part III analyzes the District Court and Fourth 
Circuit opinions. First, this Comment explains why there is no 
general right of access to government information under the First 
Amendment. Then, this Comment explains why viewpoint-based 
restrictions are the worst kind of restriction on speech, why the 
Governor's ban is viewpoint-based, and why, because of the wide 
breadth of the Governor's ban and its application to the entire 
Executive Department, the Governor's ban constitutes broad 
overarching policy. 
Part IV proposes a framework for evaluating government's 
dissemination of information to the press. Under this framework, 
broad overarching viewpoint-based government policies on the 
dissemination of government information constitute restrictions on 
speech, and therefore, deserve First Amendment scrutiny. When 
this framework is applied to The Sun case, this Comment finds that 
the Governor's ban is broad enough to chill speech and that it 
therefore violates the First Amendment. To disprove the Fourth 
Circuit's contention that striking down the Governor's ban "would 
'plant the seed of a constitutional case' in 'virtually every' 
7. See infra notes 184-206 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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interchange between public official and press,,,9 this framework is 
applied to other hypothetical scenarios to illustrate situations that 
would not give rise to a First Amendment claim. 
The purpose of this Comment is two-fold. First, it is to provide 
a response to what the author believes is a dangerous precedent set 
by the Fourth Circuit.. Under the Fourth Circuit's holding, a 
Governor can target any reporter for whatever reason and ban that 
reporter from communicating with all employees in the Executive 
Department, regardless of how many public officials that reporter 
has access to, or the months or years that may have gone into 
cultivating such access. Cultivating access to public officials is 
how a government reporter does her job, and forbidding an entire 
executive department from communicating with a reporter 
obstructs that reporter from being able to do her job. The second 
purpose of this Comment is to provide a resource for courts when 
evaluating government restrictions on the dissemination of 
information to the press. 
II. FACTUAL SUMMARY OF BALTIMORE SUNv. EHRLICH 
A. Factual Background 
1. The Ehrlich Administration's Dispute with David Nitkin 
The dispute between the Ehrlich administration and Baltimore 
Sun reporter David Nitkin arose over a series of articles Nitkin 
wrote in October and November of 2004 about a proposed sale of 
land by the state to a well-known contracting company owner, 
Willard Hackerman. lo The land was an 836 acre tract of prime 
conservation land in St. Mary's County. The 836 acre tract was 
part of a $34 million plan under former Governor Parris N. 
Glendening to protect 25,000 acres of land on the eastern shore and 
in southern Maryland. I I Following enactment of Governor 
9. Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d at 418. 
10. Mr. Hackerman is president and chief executive officer of Whiting-Turner 
Contracting Company. See David Nitkin, Land Deal Said to Aid Political Donor, 
BALT. SUN, Oct. 14,2004, at IA. David Nitkin's articles about the proposed land 
transaction were the main spark of the dispute that led to the Governor's ban 
against Nitkin. See generally Paul Moore, Op-Ed., Weighing the Merits of 
Ehrlich Complaints, BALT. SUN, April 21, 2005, at 17A [hereinafter Moore, 
Merits of Ehrlich Complaints] (describing the Ehrlich administration's 
complaints against the Baltimore Sun regarding inaccuracies and errors in its 
reporting). The Ehrlich administration has criticized the Baltimore Sun for 
alleged inaccuracies in other articles written between 2002 and 2004. See Paul 
Moore, Text of Ehrlich Complaints Against The Sun, BALT. SUN, Apr. 21, 2005, 
http://www.baltimoresun.comlnews/opinionlopedlbal-
op.moore21 ,0,6 I 97320.column [hereinafter Moore, Text of Ehrlich complaints]. 
II. Nitkin, supra note 10. 
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Glendening's plan, the purchase of the 836 acre tract of land was 
delayed as a result of budget restraints. 12 
In November 2003, the Maryland Board of Public Works, 
which is comprised of Governor Ehrlich, State Comptroller 
William Donald Schafer, and State Treasurer Nancy K. Kopp, 
voted to purchase the 836 acre tract of land. I3 In February 2004, 
the State's purchase of the land was finalized at a price of $2.5 
million. 14 
In the fall of 2004, the Maryland State Department of General 
Services notified the General Assembly that the Ehrlich 
administration was considering selling the 836 acre tract of land to 
an unidentified "benefactor.,,15 Under a proposed plan, this 
benefactor would purchase the tract at the same price paid by the 
State in February 2004, and then donate 150 acres to St. Mary's 
County for public schools. 16 The benefactor would hold the 
remaining property for a year, and then sell it to a conservation 
organization, resulting in a $7 million tax break for the 
benefactor. 17 
On October 14, 2004, David Nitkin identified the benefactor as 
Willard Hackerman. 18 In that article, Nitkin described Hackerman 
as a "politically connected force in Baltimore development," and 
he noted that Hackerman had made campaign contributions to both 
Democratic and Republican politicians. 19 Nitkin also wrote that 
Hackerman was "a member of Comptroller William Donald 
Schafer's inner circle," and noted that Comptroller Schafer could 
cast a vote on whether the sale would go through. 2o After this first 
article, Nitkin would write eighteen more articles on the proposed 
land deal over the course of a month. 
On October 20, 2004, in an article with the headline "Ehrlich 
OK'd Deal for Land," Nitkin reported on Maryland State 
Department of General Services Secretary Boyd K. Rutherford's 
testimony before the State Senate Budget and Taxation Committee 
regarding the land deal. 21 Secretary Rutherford testified that the 
12. David Nitkin & Andrew A. Green, Schaefer Defends State Plan to Sell St. Mary's 
Acreage, BALT. SUN, Oct. 23, 2004, at 4B. 
13. David Nitkin, Ehrlich: Probe of Land Deal Unneeded, BALT. SUN, Nov. 12, 
2004, at IB, 5B. 




18 Nitkin, supra note 10, at lA. 
19. Id. at 6A. 
20. !d. 
21. David Nitkin, Ehrlich OK'd Deal for Land, BALT. SUN, Oct. 20, 2004, at lA. 
The Ehrlich administration took issue with the title of Nitkin's October 14, 2004 
article, and the Baltimore Sun later printed a clarification of this title on 
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benefactor had approached him in the spring or summer of 2003 
about buying the land. 22 Secretary Rutherford further testified that 
he had briefed Governor Ehrlich about the proposed sale in 2003, 
and that Governor Ehrlich "said it was worth pursuing.,,23 
On October 25, 2004, Governor Ehrlich pulled Nitkin aside 
following a press conference and explained he did not like the 
news articles about the land transaction and that he "viewed them 
as a personal artack.,,24 In an October 26, 2004 article, Nitkin 
quoted Governor Ehrlich as stating he "never discussed the deal 
with the benefactor or anyone representing him.,,25 Governor 
Ehrlich also was quoted as stating: "I have a big problem with the 
way this story has been portrayed . . .. It is so inappropriate to 
characterize this as some sort of negotiation, some backroom deal, 
when there was no back room.,,26 On November 2, 2004, Nitkin 
reported that Governor Ehrlich had "appointed Hackerman to a 
state board that approves financing for . . . public-sector and 
nonprofit construction projects.,,27 
On November 9, 2004, Nitkin reported that Hackerman was 
withdrawing his bid for the tract of land. 28 On November 11, 
Nitkin reported that, according to documents released by the State, 
Hackerman had "hoped to build houses with a water view on 
preserved hind in St. Mary's County that he secretly negotiated to 
buy from the state.,,29 On November 16, Nitkin reported that, 
earlier that month, Governor Ehrlich had "collected $100,000 for 
his re-election campaign at a private fundraiser held by a business 
partner of ... Hackerman.,,30 
December 28, 2004. See Moore, Merits of Ehrlich Complaints, supra note 10, at 
17A. 
22. Nitkin, supra note 21, at I A. 
23. Audio C.D.: Briefing on Proposed Sale of Land in St. Mary's County, held by 
the Maryland State Senate Budget & Taxation Committee (Oct. 19,2004) (on file 
with author); see also Nitkin, supra note 21, at I A. Secretary Rutherford later 
clarified his statement and stated: "I told [the Governor] what we were trying to 
do [with the land] in the premeeting .... Everybody felt comfortable with that." 
David Nitkin, Ehrlich Neutral on Sale of Land, BALT. SUN, Oct. 26, 2004, at 4B 
[hereinafter Nitkin, Ehrlich Neutral on Land Deal]. 
24. Complaint at ~ 14, BaIt. Sun v. Ehrlich, 356 F. Supp. 2d 577 (D. Md. 2004) (No. 
04-CV -3822). 
25. Nitkin, Ehrlich Neutral on Land Deal, supra note 23, at 4B. 
26. /d. 
27. David Nitkin & Andrew A. Green, Ehrlich Appointed Developer to Panel, BALT. 
SUN, Nov. 2, 2004, at IA. 
28. David Nitkin, Hackerman Ends Plans to Purchase Land in S. Md., BALT. SUN, 
Nov. 9, 2004, at IA. 
29. Andrew A. Green & David Nitkin, Hackerman Aimed to Build Houses on 
Preserved Land, BALT. SUN, Nov. I I, 2004, at IA. 
30. David Nitkin & Andrew A. Green, Hackerman's Partner Held Fund-Raiser for 
Governor, BALT. SUN, Nov. 16,2004, at IA. The host of the event was Howard 
S. Brown, president of David S. Brown Enterprises. Nitkin reported that "Brown 
and Hackerman's Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. are partners in a project to 
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On November 18, 2004, Nitkin reported that the Ehrlich 
administration was in the process of reviewing state preservation 
lands for the purpose of selling it off to reduce the size of 
government. 31 He reported that the Maryland State Department of 
Natural Resources recently had released a list of public lands 
identified as possible candidates for sale. 32 Nitkin wrote: 
While government officials insist they are 
undertaking a smart· management review, some 
critics see a poorly conceived and executed plan 
unfolding. The Ehrlich Administration, they worry, 
may be undermining open-space goals while 
helping friends who stand to receive advance 
opportunity to snatch up valuable acreage for 
personal use. 33 
Nitkin then noted the recently cancelled land deal with 
Hackerman, and wrote that Hackerman "pledged to preserve the 
land, but documents released [by the State] ... reveal he intended 
to build homes there.,,34 
That same day, Governor Ehrlich issued a directive to the 
Executive Department. 35 The directive was authored by Deputy 
Director of Communications Gregory Massoni and disseminated to 
the Executive Department by Press Secretary Shareese 
DeLe aver. 36 The directive stated: 
Effective immediately, no one in the Executive 
Department or Agencies is to speak with David 
Nitkin or Michael Olesker until further notice. Do 
not return calls or comply with any requests. The 
Governor's Press Office feels that currently both are 
failing to objectively report on any issue dealing 
with the Ehrlich-Steele Administration. Please 
relay this information to your respective department 
heads. 37 
build a $220 million town center at an Owings Mills Metro station parking lot." 
/d. 
31. David Nitkin, UP FOR SALE? BEACHES, WOOD, PARKS, BALT. SUN, Nov. 18, 
2004, at lA. 
32. /d. 
33. Id. at 13A. 
34. /d. 
35. Complaint, supra note 24, at ~ 15. 
36. Id. at ~~ 15-16. 
37. Bait. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 437 F.3d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 2006) (alterations omitted). 
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Several days later, Governor Ehrlich went on a talk radio 
show,38 and explained that access to information about state 
government was "the only arrow in [his] quiver," and that the ban 
was "meant to have a chilling effect" on Nitkin and Olesker. 39 
2. The Ehrlich Administration's Dispute with Michael Olesker 
In his dispute with Baltimore Sun columnist Michael Olesker, 
Governor Ehrlich alleged that Olesker was fabricating quotes by 
public officials in his columns. 4o On November 16,2004, Olesker 
wrote a column about how Governor Ehrlich was playing a starring 
role in the State's advertisement campaign to promote Maryland 
tourism. 4 I In that column, Olesker described an interchange he 
had with a public official concerning the advertisements: "The 
Governor's spokesman, Paul E. Schurick, struggling mightily to 
keep a straight face, said political gain was 'not a consideration' 
when making the commercials. ,,42 The Ehrlich administration 
challenged the column and explained that Olesker was not even 
present at the meeting where this discussion took place.43 Olesker 
admitted that he was not at the meeting, and on November 24, he 
wrote an apology to his readers for any confusion he had caused by 
the November 16th column. 44 
3. The Effect of the Governor's Ban 
David Nitkin made the following allegations in two affidavits 
filed with his complaint. On November 22, 2004, Nitkin contacted 
the Governor's Press Secretary, Henry Fawell, to get a comment 
for an article, but Mr. Fawell replied: "[T]he ban is still in 
effect.,,45 That same day, Nitkin contacted the Governor's Budget 
Secretary, James DiPaula, but Mr. DiPaula's secretary informed 
Nitkin that he would have to contact. the Governor's Press Office.46 
On November 23, 2004, Nitkin called Anne Hubbard, a 
38. Governor Ehrlich appeared on WBAL's Chip Franklin Show on November 26, 
2004. Jennifer McMenamin, Ehrlich Says He Intended 'Chilling Effect . . BALT. 
SUN, Nov. 27, 2004, at IB-2B. 
39. Complaint, supra note 24, at 'Il17. 
40. See generally Moore, Text of Ehrlich Complaints, supra note 10 (describing 
several articles where the Ehrlich administration alleged Olesker fabricated 
quotes by public officials in his column). Michael Olesker no longer writes for 
the Baltimore Sun. Nick Madigan, Longtime Columnist Olesker Resigns, BALT. 
SUN, Jan. 4, 2006, at lB. 
41. Michael OIesker, Ehrlich Looks Good on TV, Not on Record, BALT. SUN, Nov. 
16, 2004, at lB. 
42. Id. at 5B. 
43. See Moore, Merits of Ehrlich Complaints, supra note 10, at 17 A. 
44. Michael OIesker, It's All About the Job-Not the Political Parties, BALT. SUN, 
Nov. 24, 2004,at4B. 
45. Bait. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 437 F.3d 410,413 (4th CiL 2006). 
46. Id. 
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spokeswoman for the Department of General Services, to get a 
comment for an article.47 Ms. Hubbard replied: "David, I can't 
talk to you. ,,48 
On December 30, 2004, Nitkin was excluded from a press 
briefing held in the Governor's conference room.49 Later, Nitkin 
received invitations to attend press briefings from the Governor, 
and he attended three of them during the two months after the ban 
was implemented. 50 Nitkin is still allowed to make public 
information requests pursuant to Maryland's Public Information 
Act,51 and he has continued to receive public press releases from 
the Governor's Office. 52 
Olesker alleged in his affidavit that several state government 
representatives and employees have not returned his telephone 
calls. 53 On November 29, 2004, Olesker made three telephone 
calls to the Governor's Press Office that were not returned. 54 
Other Baltimore Sun reporters still have access to Executive 
Department officials and employees. 55 Requests made on behalf 
of Nitkin and Olesker by other Sun reporters have been answered 
by the Ehrlich administration. 56 
In December 2004, the Baltimore Sun, David Nitkin and 
Michael Olesker collectively filed a lawsuit against Governor 
Ehrlich, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions against 
enforcement of the ban. 57 In its claim, the Baltimore Sun alleged 
that Governor Ehrlich's ban was unconstitutional retaliation and 




49. Id. at 414. 
50. Id. 
51. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-630 (West 2002). 




56. In his appellate brief, the Governor described one occasion where Nitkin stood 
beside a television reporter conducting an interview with the Governor, and 
Nitkin passed questions to the television reporter so that the Governor would 
answer. Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 49, Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 
2006) (No. 05-1297). 
57. Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d at 413. 
58. Complaint, supra note 24, at ~~ 1, 25. The Sun's claim was brought under 42 
V.S.c. § 1983 (2006). Id. at ~ 21. 
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B. Lower Court Opinions 
1. The District Court Opinion 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Judge 
Quarles, dismissed the Baltimore Sun's complaint. 59 In his 
opinion, Judge Quarles explained that the Supreme Court has 
"refused to recognize-or construct-a First Amendment right of 
access to all sources of information within governmental 
control.,,60 Quotinr the Supreme Court plurality opinion, Houchins v. KQED, 6 Judge Quarles explained that "there is no 
discernible basis for a constitutional duty to disclose, or for 
standards governing disclosure of or access to information.,,62 
Judge Quarles also cited an unreported Fourth Circuit opinion, 
Snyder v. Ringgold,63 where the Fourth Circuit "declined to 
recognize a journalist's right to have equal access to public 
information sources and to be treated the same as· other 
joumalists.,,64 
Following Ringgold, Judge Quarles held: "[A] government 
may lawfully make content-based distinctions in the way it 
provides press access to information not available to the public 
generally.,,65 Judge Quarles explained the press has no right of 
access beyond that of the public, and that the information sought 
by Olesker and Nitkin was "far beyond any citizen's reasonable 
expectations of access to his or her government.,,66 
2. The Fourth Circuit Opinion 
The Fourth Circuit focused its analysis of the Baltimore Sun's 
retaliation claim on whether the Governor's ban had created a 
chilling effect on the speech of Nitkin and Olesker. 67 The court 
explained that the standard applied in evaluating the potential 
chilling effect of government conduct is an objective one, and the 
59. Bait. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 356 F. Supp. 2d 577, 578 (D. Md. 2005), affd, 437 F.3d 
410 (4th Cir. 2006). 
60. !d. at 580. 
61. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
62. Bait. Sun, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 580 (quoting Houchins, 438 U.S. at 14). 
63. No. 97-1358, 1998 WL 13528 (4th Cir. Jan. 15, 1998) (dismissing reporter's 
claim that her First Amendment rights were violated by the police department 
requiring her to send written requests for information, whereas, other reporters 
were permitted to page the police department and the police would respond by 
phone to their information requests). 
64. Bait. Sun, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 581. 
65. ld. 
66. /d. at 582. 
67. BaIt. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 437 F.3d 410, 417 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that Governor 
Ehrlich conceded all elements of a retaliation claim, except the element that the 
Governor's ban had allegedly chilled the speech of Nit kin and Olesker). 
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court defined it as being "whether a similarly situated person of 
'ordinary firmness' reasonably would be chilled by the government 
conduct in light of the circumstances presented in the particular 
case. ,,68 The court noted that, in order to have an actionable 
retaliation claim, the challenged government conduct must be 
"something more than a ' de minimis inconvenience' to [an 
individual's] exercise of First Amendment rights.,,69 The court 
also noted that no actionable retaliation claim exists if recognizing 
the claim would "'plant the seed of a constitutional case' in 
'virtually every' interchange" between government operations and 
the public. 70 
At the beginning of its analysis, the Fourth Circuit noted that 
the Baltimore Sun had conceded at oral argument that the 
hypothetical scenario of one "public official's selective preferential 
communication to his favorite reporter or reporters would not give 
the much larger class of unrewarded reporters retaliation claims." 71 
The court then proclaimed there is no distinction between the 
hypothetical scenario of one public official refusing to speak to a 
reporter and the facts of The Sun case, and that as a result, 
"allow[ing] The Sun to proceed on its retaliation claim ... would 
'plant the seed of a constitutional case' in 'virtually every' 
interchange between public official and press.,,72 The court then 
held: "[I]n the circumstances of this case, no actionable retaliation 
claim arises when a government official denies a reporter access to 
discretionarily afforded information or refuses to answer 
questions." 73 . -
The court then evaluated the potential chilling effect of the 
Governor's ban, and held that the ban posed a de minimis 
inconvenience and therefore was not actionable. 74 In response to 
the Baltimore Sun's argument that the Governor's ban "greatly 
disadvantaged" Nitkin and Olesker in their reporting, the court 
explained: "While Nitkin and Olesker might now be disfavored, 
they are no more disfavored than the many reporters without 
access to the Govemor.,,75 The court then held: 
We cannot accept that the Governor's directive ... 
created a chilling effect any different from or 
greater than that experienced by The Sun and by all 
68. Id. at 416. 
69. Id. (quoting Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 
474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005». 
70. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983». 
71. Id. at 418. 
72. Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 149). 
73. /d. 
74. /d. at 418-19. 
75. Id. at 419-20. 
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reporters in their everyday journalistic activities. 
Accordingly, we conclude .... a reporter endures 
only de minimis inconvenience when a government 
official denies the reporter access to discretionary 
information or refuses to answer the reporter's 
questions because the official disagrees with the 
substance or manner of the reporter's previous 
expression in reporting. 76 
145 
The court also noted that each reporter had written nearly the same 
number of articles on state government in the eight weeks after the 
ban was implemented as they had written in the eight weeks prior 
to the ban being implemented,77 and the court pointed to this as 
evidence that the reporters had "not been chilled to any substantial 
degree in their reporting." 78 
III. ANALYSIS OF LOWER COURT OPINIONS 
A. The Lower Courts Correctly Held No General Right oj Access 
to Government Information 
The U.S. District Court in Baltimore Sun v. Ehrlich correctly 
held there is no general right of access to government information 
under the First Amendment. 79 In his opinion, Judge Quarles cited 
the Supreme Court case,80 Houchins v. KQED. 81 In Houchins, a 
sheriff denied a T.V. news station access to part of a jail where an 
inmate had recently committed suicide. 82 In holding that the 
sheriff's denial of access did not violate the First Amendment, the 
Supreme Court stated in its plurality opinion: "Neither the First 
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of 
access to government information or sources of information within 
the government's control.,,83 Although Houchins was a plurality 
opinion, the Court eventually adopted the plurality holding of 
76. ld. at 420. The court also held that the implied threat of the Governor's ban to 
Nitkin and Olesker, and Governor Ehrlich's comments on the news radio show, 
were protected government speech. ld. at 420-21. 
77. !d. at 415. 
78. Id. at 419. The court also noted that at oral argument, counsel for the reporters 
could not answer the question of whether the reporters had been chilled in their 
speech. Id. at 419 n.!. 
79. See Bait. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 356 F. Supp. 2d 577, 582 (D. Md. 2005), aff'd, 437 
F .3d 41 0 (4th Cir. 2006). The only discussion of the right of access issue in the 
Fourth Circuit opinion is when the court repeats the District Court's holding. See 
Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d at 415. 
80. Bait. Sun, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 580. 
81. 438 U.S. I (1978). 
82. Id. at 3. 
83. !d. at 15. 
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Houchins in Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting 
Publishing Corp. 84 
The fact that Houchins was a plurality opinion is evidence of 
the difficulty the Supreme Court had throughout the 1960s and 
1970s deciding whether the First Amendment provided a right of 
access to government information. 85 During this period, there was 
a spirited debate among legal commentators over whether the Free 
Press clause provided rights for the press distinct from rights 
provided under the Free Speech clause. 86 Some commentators 
opined that the Free Press clause provided additional rights for 
members of the press. 87 These commentators suggested that these 
additional rights included, in certain circumstances, a special right 
of access to government information. 88 Other commentators 
rejected this theory and explained that the First Amendment did 
not impose any duty on government to disclose information. 89 
84. 528 U.S. 32 (1999). For a discussion of United Reporting, see irifra notes 201-
206 and accompanying text. 
85. The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether the First Amendment 
provided a right to gather information in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I (1965). The 
plaintiff in Zemel challenged a State Department policy that prohibited 
Americans from traveling to Cuba, claiming the policy violated his First 
Amendment right to gather information. Id. at 16. The Court dismissed this 
challenge, explaining: "The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the 
unrestrained right to gather information." Id. at 17. 
86. See generally Lillian R. Be Vier, An Informed Public, An Informing Press: The 
Search for a Constitutional.Principle, 68 CAL. L. REv. 482, 482 (1980) (noting 
"the appearance in the legal litt;1rature of arguments by prominent and respected 
commentators about whether the [Free Press clause] ... ought to be construed 
independently of the [Free Expression clause] so that new constitutional doctrine 
can be developed."). 
87. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What 
Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 650 (1975) 
(suggesting that "for some purposes freedom of the press should confer greater 
rights than does freedom of speech"); William W. Van Alstyne, The First 
Amendment and the Free Press: A Comment on Some New Trends and Some Old 
Theories, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. I, 14 (1980) (suggesting that the Supreme Court 
ought to "constitutionalize a 'preferred' position for the regularly reporting 
press"). 
88. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 87, at 653-55 (explaining that the Free Expression 
Clause and the Free Press Clause each serve unique interests, and in the context 
where a govemment restriction affects both free expression and free press 
interests, the "combined speech-press interests" may outweigh the govemment 
interest behind the restriction, when "[e]ither interest alone might not"); Van 
Alstyne, supra note 87, at 13 (suggesting a '''system' of differentiated [F]irst 
[A]mendment freedoms for the regularly reporting press[,]" including "[m]ore 
substantial entitlements of access" to information). 
89. See BeVier, supra note 86, at 484 (explaining the author "is skeptical about 
whether the [Supreme] Court's rhetorical affirmations of the public's right to be 
informed and the press' contribution to the flow of information ... can 
legitimately be invoked to transform the Constitution into a vehicle for imposing 
a duty to disclose upon the govemment."); Note, The Rights of the Public and the 
Press to Gather Iriformation, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1505, 1512-13 (1974) ("[N]either 
the courts nor Congress has recognized an affirmative constitutional obligation to 
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These commentators explained that government's release of 
information was an issue for the political branches to decide, and 
that courts are ill-suited to resolve such issues. 9o 
Justice Potter Stewart offered his own commentary on the 
subject in a speech at Yale Law School in 1974.91 In this oft-
quoted speech, Justice Stewart explained that the textual 
distinction in the Constitution between freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press is significant, and that the rights provided 
under the Free Press clause are not merely redundant of the Free 
Speech clause.92 In Justice Stewart's view, the Free Press clause 
was intended by the Founders to serve as a check on government. 93 
He explained that to the British Crown "the free press meant 
organized, expert scrutiny of government" and that "[t]his 
formidable check on official power was what the British Crown 
had feared-and what the American Founders decided to risk.,,94 
After recognizing the important check on government that the 
Free Press clause was meant to provide, Justice Stewart, in the 
same breath, rejected any notion of a constitutional right of access 
to government information. 95 Offering insight into the Supreme 
Court's thinking at that time, he explained: 
The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of 
Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act. The 
Constitution . . . establishes the contest, not its 
resolution. Congress may provide a resolution ... 
through carefully drawn legislation. For the rest, 
we must rely, as so often in our system we must, on 
the tug and pull of the political forces in American 
society. 96 
disclose, and the Constitution itself contains no language from which such a duty 
could readily be inferred."). 
90. BeVier, supra note 86, at 516-17 ("[T]he question of whether citizens' demands 
for information ought to be honored is not merely quite unsuitable for judicial 
resolution, but also seems plainly to have been committed to the branches of 
government entrusted with making and administering the laws."); Note, supra 
note 89, at 1511 ("[It is] unrealistic to expect the courts ... to assume a 
continuing supervisory role to assure that the branches of government meet 
affirmative disclosure obligations."). 
91. See Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press, "26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). 
92. /d. at 633-34. Justice Stewart noted that "[b ]etween 1776 and the drafting of our 
Constitution, many of the state constitutions contained clauses protecting 
freedom of the press while at the same time recognizing no general freedom of 
speech. By including both guarantees in the First Amendment, the Founders 
quite clearly recognized the distinction between the two." ld. 
93. See id. at 634 ("The primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee of a free 
press was . . . to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an 
additional check on the three official branches."). 
94. ld. 
95. See id. at 636. 
96. ld. 
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The Supreme Court grappled with the right of access issue in a 
series of cases involving access to prisons. 97 The first of these 
cases were Pel! v. Procunier98 and Saxbe v. Washington Post 
Co.,99 both decided on the same day in 1974. 100 In both cases, 
members of the press challenged prison regulations that prohibited 
reporters from having one-on-one interviews with prisoners. 101 
The asserted government interest behind the regulations was 
security-prisoners who were receiving press attention had a 
tendency to cause disturbances in the prisons. 102 
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in both cases, noted that 
despite the ban on one-on-one interviews, the press still enjoyed a 
right of access equal to that of the public, and Justice Stewart 
characterized the press' challenge of the prison regulations as a 
demand for "special access" to government information. l03 The 
Court upheld the prison regulations, explaining: "The Constitution 
does not . . . require government to accord the press special access 
to information not shared by members of the public generally.,,104 
While in Pel! and Saxbe the Supreme Court affirmatively stated 
the First Amendment provides no "special right of access" for the 
press beyond that provided to the public generally, the Court did 
not answer the question of whether government is obligated under 
the First Amendment to open its prison doors to the public and 
press at all. 105 The Court examined this issue in Houchins and, as 
previously noted, decided the First Amendment does not mandate 
any right of access to government information or sources of 
information within the government's control. l06 The Court's 
97. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Pecunier, 417 U.S. 817 
(1974); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 
98. 417U.S.at819. 
99. 417 U.S. at 843. 
100. The main distinction between Pell and Saxbe is that Pell involved a state prison, 
and Saxbe involved a federal prison. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 819; Saxbe, 417 U.S. 
at 844. 
101. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 819; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844. 
102. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 831; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 846. 
103. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 834. In deciding Saxbe, the Court relied on its holding in 
Pell, explaining the two cases were "constitutionally indistinguishable from [one 
another]." Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850. 
104. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834. In their dissenting opinion in Saxbe, Justices Powell, 
Brennan and Marshall suggested a balancing approach to analyzing the prison 
regulations. They explained: 
At some point official restraints on access to news sources, even 
though not directed solely at the press, may so undermine the 
function of the First Amendment that it is both appropriate and 
necessary to require the government to justify such regulations in 
terms more compelling than discretionary authority and 
administrative convenience. 
Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 860. 
105. See Pell, 417 U.S. 817; Saxbe, 417 U.S. 843. 
106. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. I, 15 (1978). 
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rationale was that there is "no discernible basis for a constitutional 
duty to disclose" infonnation and that "absent statutory standards, 
hundreds of judges would . . . be at large to fashion ad hoc 
standards . . . according to their own ideas of what seems 
'desirable' or 'expedient.'"107 
Another category of "press access" cases are ones in which 
reporters have demanded access to criminal trials. \08 In Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,109 reporters challenged a court order 
that prohibited the public from attending a murder trial. I 10 The 
Supreme Court struck down the court order, and in doing so, gave 
special attention to the history of criminal trials being open to the 
public. III The Court explained that "throughout its evolution, the 
trial has been open to the public to all who care to observe." 112 
Based upon the historical record of criminal trials being open to 
the public, the Court recognized a right of access to criminal trials 
under the First Amendment. 113 The Court held: "Absent an 
overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal 
case must be open to the public." I 14 
The rule to be taken from the Supreme Court's right of access 
cases is that, with the exception of criminal trials, government is 
not obligated under the First Amendment to provide the public 
with access to infonnation within its control. 115 The press' only 
107. Id. at 14. Justice Stewart concurred with the plurality that the public has no right 
of access to information controlled by government, noting: "The Constitution 
does no more than assure the public and the press equal access once government 
has opened its doors." Id. at 16. But in diverging from the plurality opinion, 
Justice Stewart explained there are "practical distinctions" between the press and 
public, providing as an example a reporter's use of cameras and sound equipment 
during a prison tour, compared to a member of the public who carries no 
equipment. Id. at 16-17. Justice Stewart explained "equal access" among the 
press and public "must be accorded more flexibility ... to accommodate the 
practical distinctions between the press and the general public." /d. at 16. 
108. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 
U.S. 368 (1979). 
109. 448 U.S. 555. 
110. Id. at 559-60. 
Ill. Id. at 564-75. 
112. Id. at 564. 
113. See id. at 577 ("The right of access to places traditionally open to the public, as 
criminal trials have long been, may be seen as assured by the amalgam of the 
First Amendment guarantees of speech and press .... "). 
114. Id. at 581. Although Richmond Newspapers was a plurality opinion, its holding 
was later adopted by a majority of the Court in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
115. See Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: 
Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO 
ST. LJ. 249, 309 (2004) ("[The Supreme Court] has declined to recognize the 
existence of a First Amendment right to gather information from government 
sources outside of the discrete area of criminal judicial proceedings."). 
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right of access to government information is a right of access equal 
to that of the public generally. 116 
Thus, to the extent that the Baltimore Sun's argument before the 
U.S. District Court or the Fourth Circuit was that Nitkin and 
Olesker must be permitted to speak to Executive Branch 
employees because of their special rights under the Free Press 
clause, the courts correctly rejected this argument. 
B. Why the District Court and Fourth Circuit Erred in Upholding 
the Governor's Ban 
1. Each Court Failed to Acknowledge that the Governor's Ban is 
Viewpoint-Based 
Neither the District Court nor the Fourth Circuit in Baltimore 
Sun v. Ehrlich acknowledged that the Governor's ban is viewpoint-
based. And in doing so, both courts overlooked cases from other 
jurisdictions where courts have struck down viewpoint-based 
restrictions on the dissemination of government information. 117 
The District Court and the Fourth Circuit also overlooked the 
Supreme Court case, Los An~eles Police Department v. United 
Reporting Publishing Corp., 11 where, in dictum, eight out of nine 
Justices agreed that government cannot condition the release of 
government information on a recipient's viewpoint if doing so 
threatens to chill or suppress that viewpoint. 119 
Before discussing these cases, this Comment explains the 
difference between content-neutral, content-based, and viewpoint-
based restrictions on speech, the legal standards applied to each 
type of restriction, and why viewpoint-based restrictions are 
considered the worst kind of restriction on speech. After 
discussing why viewpoint-based restrictions are considered the 
worst kind of restriction on speech, this Comment explains why 
the Governor's ban is viewpoint-based. Then this Comment 
discusses two cases where courts struck down viewpoint-based 
restrictions on government's dissemination of information, and the 
Supreme Court's dictum in United Reporting. 
116. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
117. See infra notes 184-200 and accompanying text. 
118. 528 U.S. 32 (1999). 
119. See id. at 41-43 (Scalia, J., concurring) (Ginsburg, J., concurring), 47-48 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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a. First Amendment Free Expression Standards 
The Supreme Court has recognized three general types of 
restrictions on speech: content-neutral, content-based, and 
viewpoint-based. 120 
1. Content-neutral restrictions 
Content-neutral restrictions limit speech without regard to the 
content of what is being expressed. 121 Examples of content-neutral 
restrictions include laws that regulate the "time, place, and 
manner" 122 of speech, such as laws that restrict noisy speeches 
near hospitals or ban billboards in residential neighborhoods. 123 
The general standard applied to content-neutral restrictions is that 
they must further a substantial government interest, and they are 
not substantially broader than necessary and leave open alternative 
channels for communication. 124 
n. Content-based restrictions 
Content-based restrictions limit speech based upon the content 
of the expression. 125 Content-based restrictions can be viewpoint-
based or viewpoint-neutral. 126 While all viewpoint-based 
restrIctIOns are also content-based, not all content-based 
restrictions are viewpoint-based. 127 For the purpose of clarity, in 
120. See generally John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1103, 1104-05 
(2005) (distinguishing among content-neutral, content-based, and viewpoint-
based speech restrictions). 
121. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000) ("[GJovernment regulation of 
expressive activity is 'content neutral' if it is justified without reference to the 
content of regulated speech."); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation 
and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983) ("Content-neutral 
restrictions limit communication without regard to the message conveyed."). 
122. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). 
123. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 48 
(1987). 
124. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 800 (1989) (explaining 
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech are justified if 
"they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and ... 
they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information," and defining "narrowly tailored" to mean the restriction is "not 
substantially broader than necessary"); see also City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 
43, 56-59 (1994) (holding a city ordinance that prohibited homeowners from 
displaying signs on their property violated the First Amendment because the 
ordinance did not leave open adequate alternative channels of communication). 
125. Fee, supra note 120, at 1133 ("[AJ regulation of speech is content-based if it is 
justified by reference to speech content, or if it facially discriminates on the basis 
of speech content .... "). 
126. See MaIjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 
100-0 I (1996) (explaining that the Supreme Court sometimes uses the terms 
"content" and "viewpoint" interchangeably). 
127. For a discussion of the distinction between content-based and viewpoint-based 
restrictions, see infra notes 150-157 and accompanying text. 
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this Comment, "content-based restrictions" denotes content-based 
restrictions that are viewpoint-neutral. 128 
Content-based· restrictions that are viewpoint-neutral limit 
speech based upon the subject matter or category of speech, but do 
not target specific ideas or viewpoints within those categories of 
speech. 129 For example, a regulation that bans the distribution of 
all leaflets on state fair grounds is content-neutral; 130 but a 
regulation banning the distribution of political campaign leaflets 
would be content-based. 131 Other examples of content-based 
restrictions include, a statute prohibiting all types of picketing near 
public school buildings, except for peaceful labor picketing; 132 a 
statute prohibiting political messages on the interior advertising 
spaces of city transit vehicles; \33 or, a statute rrohibiting political 
campaigning within 100 feet of a polling place. 34 
In contrast to content-neutral restrictions on speech, which the 
Supreme Court has recognized often serve legitimate government 
purposes,135 content-based restrictions on speech are 
"presumptively invalid," 136 and the Court applies strict scrutiny to 
content-based restrictions. 137 Strict scrutiny means that in order 
for a statute to be upheld, "it must be narrowly tailored to promote 
a compelling Government interest." 138 When strict scrutiny is 
128. Content-based restrictions that are viewpoint-neutral are sometimes referred to as 
"subject matter restrictions." See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) 
(referring to viewpoint-neutral, content-based restrictions as "subject matter" 
restrictions); see also Stone, supra note 121, at 239. 
129. See Stone, supra note 121, at 239 ("[Content-based] restrictions are directed, not 
at particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information, but at entire subjects of 
expression."). 
130. Stone, supra note 121, at 223; see also Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,648-49 (1981) (holding state fair grounds rule 
prohibiting distribution on fair grounds of any printed or written material, except 
from a fixed location, was content-neutral). 
131. Cf Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (holding statute prohibiting political 
campaigning within 100 feet of a polling place was content-based). 
132. See Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); see also Carey v. 
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (holding a ban on residential picketing that 
exempted labor picketing was content-based). 
133. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
134. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 191. 
135. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) ("Civil liberties ... imply 
the existence of an organized society maintaining public order. . .. The authority 
of a municipality to impose [time, place, and manner restrictions] in order to 
assure the safety and convenience of the people ... has never been regarded as 
inconsistent with civil liberties."). 
136. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see also U.S. v. 
Playboy Entrn't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000) ("It is rare that a 
regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible."). 
137. See Fee, supra note 120, at 1120. 
138. Playboy Entm 't, 529 U.S. at 813. 
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applied to a statute, the statute is usually held unconstitutional, 139 
unless it is a restriction on speech on government property. 140 
Content-based restrictions on speech receive heightened 
scrutiny because such restrictions pose a danger of censoring ideas 
and opinions. 141 The Supreme Court has explained: "[C]ontent 
discrimination 'raises the specter that the government may 
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the 
marketplace. '" 142 
Nonpublic forums are the only instance where content-based 
restrictions on speech are generally upheld. 143 For example, the 
Supreme Court upheld content-based restrictions in allowing 
access to public school interoffice mailboxes,144 and to charity 
drives among federal government employees. 145 The Court also 
upheld content-based restrictions on the distribution of literature on 
sidewalks near post office entrances. 146 The Court applies a lesser 
standard of scrutiny-not strict scrutiny-to content-based 
restrictions on speech in nonpublic forums. 147 The reason for this 
139. See Fee, supra note 120, at 1120 (explaining whenever the Court applies strict 
scrutiny to a law, the Court "usually finds the law unconstitutional."); see also 
Stone, supra note 123, at 48 (explaining that from 1957 to 1987, "the Court ... 
invalidated almost every content-based restriction that it ... considered"). But 
see Burson, 504 U.S. at 206-11 (holding statute prohibiting political campaigning 
within 100 feet of a polling place was narrowly tailored and served a compelling 
government interest in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud). 
140. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (holding regulation prohibiting 
political speeches and demonstrations on military base did not violate the First 
Amendment). 
141. "[T]he 'danger of censorship' presented by a facially content-based statute 
requires that that weapon be employed only where it [meets strict scrutiny] .... " 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395 (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 (1991) 
(internal citations omitted»; see also Aschcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 
(2004) ("Content-based prohibitions . . . have the constant potential to be a 
repressive force in the lives and thoughts of a free people."). 
142. R.A.v., 505 U.S. at 387 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. 
State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991». One commentator notes 
that what courts really look for in content discrimination cases is how closely the 
discrimination resembles viewpoint discrimination. Heins, supra note 126, at 
101. 
143. There are three general types of fora: (I) traditional public fora (e.g., public 
streets and parks), (2) the public fora created by government designation (e.g., a 
municipal auditorium and a city-leased theatre designed and dedicated for 
expressive activity), and (3) nonpublic fora (e.g., military bases and prison 
grounds). Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
802-04 (1985). The Court has explained: "Implicit in the concept of the 
nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject 
matter and speaker identity." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 
460 U.S. 37,49 (1983). 
144. See Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. 37. 
145. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
146. See U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732-33 (1990) (holding ban against 
solicitation on Postal Service grounds was reasonable because "solicitation is 
inherently disruptive of the Postal Service's business"). 
147. See infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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lesser standard of scrutiny is that "the State, no less than a private 
owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its 
control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated." 148 Although 
a lesser standard of scrutiny is applied in nonpublic forums, and 
content-based restrictions need only be "reasonable in light of the 
purpose served by the forum[,]" the government "violates the First 
Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress 
the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible 
subject." 149 
iii. Viewpoint-based restrictions 
Viewpoint-based restrictions limit speech based upon the 
specific idea or opinion that is being expressed. 150 Viewpoint-
based restrictions are a subcategory of content-based 
restrictions. 151 Viewpoint-based restrictions differ from content-
based restrictions in that government suppresses entire categories 
of speech in content-based restrictions, including all viewpoints 
within that category of speech, while with viewpoint-based 
restrictions, the government is "taking sides" on a particular 
issue. 152 The government's purpose in enacting viewpoint-based 
restrictions on speech is to advance a favored viewpoint and 
suppress a disfavored viewpoint,153 or "create an unequal playing 
field" between competing views. 154 For example, as noted 
previously, a regulation banning the distribution of political 
campaign leaflets on state fair grounds is a content-based 
restriction. 155 Regulations banning the distribution of Democratic 
party leaflets, but not Republican,156 or banning anti-war 
leafleting, but not pro-war leafleting, would be viewpoint-based 
restrictions. 157 
Other examples of viewpoint-based restrictions include a statute 
that prohibits flag-burning for purposes of dishonoring the flag, but 
148. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (quoting U.S. Postal Servo V. Greenburgh Civic 
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981». 
149. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. 
ISO. See Stone, supra note 121, at 199 ("[Viewpoint-based] restrictions attempt 
substantially to eliminate particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information 
from public debate and thus undermine the values and purposes underlying the 
[F]irst [A]mendment."). 
151. See Rosenberger V. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830-31 
(1995). 
152. [d. at 894-95 (Souter, 1., dissenting). 
153. See id. at 894 (Souter, 1., dissenting) ("[V]iewpoint discrimination occurs when 
government allows one message while prohibiting the messages of those who can 
reasonably be expected to respond."). 
154. Fee, supra note 120, at 1108. 
155. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
156. See Stone, supra note 121, at 223. 
157. See Fee, supra note 120, at 1108. 
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not flag-burning for purposes of disposing of flags (disfavors the 
viewpoint that is critical of American §overnment); 158 or an 
ordinance that prohibits "fighting words" IS when used to express 
racial or religious hatred, but not "fighting words" when used to 
express racial or religious tolerance (disfavors the viewpoint of the 
bigot); 160 or a policy that permits groups to meet in school 
classrooms after hours to discuss child-rearing, but not religious 
groups discussing child rearing (disfavors the religious viewpoint 
on child-rearing). 161 
This element of government "taking sides" and favoring one 
viewpoint while suppressing another makes viewpoint-based 
restrictions "the most pernicious of all [restrictions] based on 
content." 162 The Supreme Court has recognized that "[w]hen the 
government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken 
by speakers on a sub~ect, the violation of the First Amendment is 
all the more blatant." 63 And that "[v]iewpoint discrimination is .. 
. an egregious form of content discrimination." 164 
Viewpoint-based restrictions are the worst kind of government 
restriction on speech because such restrictions have a "unique~ 
powerful distorting effect" 165 and they "skew[] public debate." I 6 
As Alexander Meiklejohn explains, government "mutilat[es). .. 
the thinking process of the community" when it favors one 
viewpoint over another. 167 
This "mutilation" of the public's thinking process strikes at the 
core principles underlying the First Amendment. 168 One of these 
158. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
159. "Fighting words" are defined as words, "which by their very utterance inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
160. R.A.V. v. City ofSt. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
161. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
162. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 895 (1995) 
(Souter, 1., dissenting). 
163. Id. at 829 (majority opinion). 
164. Id. See also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) (noting that viewpoint-
based restrictions are a more "obnoxious" form of speech regulation than content-
based restrictions). 
165. Stone, supra note 121, at 200. 
166. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 894 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
167. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELA nON TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
26 (1948) (some emphasis removed). 
168. Id. at 26-27. The Supreme Court has explained: "At the heart of the First 
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him or herself 
the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression . . .. Our political system and 
cultural life rest upon this ideal . . .. Government action that stifles speech 
[because] of its message ... contravenes this essential right." Turner Broad. Sys., 
Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). See also Heins, supra note 126, at 100 
(explaining the core values underlying the First Amendment include the "right to 
think, believe, and speak freely, the fostering of intellectual and spiritual growth, 
and the free exchange of ideas . . .. [And that] [g]ovemment action that 
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core principles is the principle that more speech is better than less 
speech; that it is better for government to allow the expression of 
all views and ideas-even those views that are false or 
dangerous-than to suppress speech. 169 
Why must government allow all speech, even dangerous speech 
under the First Amendment? Because, as Justice Holmes 
explained in his famous dissent, "the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas[,] [and] the best test of truth is 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market. . .. That at any rate is the theory of our 
Constitution.,,17o Justice Brandeis added to this explanation: 
[Those who won our independence] believed liberty 
to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the 
secret of liberty. . .. [They believed that] 
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection 
against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; . . . 
They recognized the risks to which all human 
institutions are subject. But they knew that order 
cannot be secured merely through fear of 
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to 
discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear 
breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that 
hate menaces stable government; that the path of 
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely 
supposed grievances and proposed remedies; . . . 
Believing in the power of reason as applied through 
public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by 
law-the argument of force in its worst form. 171 
Because viewpoint-based restnctlOns restrain ideas and 
opinions from entering the "marketplace of ideas" I72 and distort 
public debate, such restrictions are heavily scrutinized. 173 While 
suppresses or burdens speech on the basis of its viewpoint threatens ... these 
values .... "). 
169. See Whitney v. Ca., 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("If there 
be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil 
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not 
enforced silence."); see also Stone, supra note 121, at 212-13 ("[T]he [F]irst 
[A]mendment assumes that ideas and information are not in themselves 'harmful, 
that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough 
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of 
communication rather than to close them. '" (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy 
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976»). 
170. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
171. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76. 
172. Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 
(1984). 
173. See id. (explaining though sometimes a "state may . . . curtail speech when 
necessary to advance a significant and legitimate state interest[,] . . . there are 
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content-based restrictions receive strict scrutiny, viewpoint-based 
restrictions receive even stricter scrutiny. Once a court finds that a 
particular restriction on speech is viewpoint-based, the court 
almost always strikes it down. 174 
b. Why the Governor's Ban is Viewpoint-Based 
The Governor's ban is facially viewpoint-based as a result of its 
stated rationale that Nitkin and Olesker were "failing to objectively 
report" on the Ehrlich administration. 175 "Objectivity" in reporting 
is inherently viewpoint-based because, ironical~, defining 
objectivity in reporting is a subjective process. 17 Defining 
objectivity in reporting is a subjective process because what is 
objective reporting to one person inevitably will be considered 
some purported interests-such as a desire . . . to exclude the expression of 
certain points of view from the marketplace of ideas-that are so plainly 
illegitimate that they would immediately invalidate the rule."). 
174. The Supreme Court case, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), 
illustrates how viewpoint-based restrictions receive stricter scrutiny than the 
already heightened scrutiny applied to content-based restrictions. R.A. V. 
involved a city ordinance that prohibited the "plac[ing] on public or private 
property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti ... which one 
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." Id. at 380. The 
ordinance was construed as only reaching those expressions that constitute 
"fighting words" on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender. Id. 
The Court first explained how the city ordinance was facially content-based: 
"Those who wish to use 'fighting words' in connection with other ideas-to 
express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union 
membership, or homosexuality-are not covered." Id. at 391. The Court then 
explained how the ordinance, in its "practical operation" went "beyond mere 
content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination." Id. The Court 
explained how under the Minnesota Supreme Court's construction of the 
ordinance, to which the Supreme Court was bound, it prohibited fighting words 
only when used to express intolerance or '''bias-motivated' hatred" on the basis 
of the specified categories. Id. at 392. 
After identifying the ordinance as being both content-based and viewpoint-
based, the Court applied strict scrutiny to the content-based distinction. /d. at 
395. The Court held the ordinance failed strict scrutiny because it was not 
narrowly tailored-the Court explained an ordinance that did not list the specific 
categories of speech would have been just as effective. Id. at 395-96. The Court 
then explained the only purpose served by the content limitation was to display 
the city council's "special hostility" towards the viewpoint of the bigot. ld. at 
396. The Court noted: "That is precisely what the First Amendment forbids. The 
politicians of St. Paul are entitled to express that hostility-but not through the 
means of imposing unique limitations upon speakers who ... disagree." /d. 
Thus, under the Court's analysis, the ordinance's facially content-based 
restriction was invalid because the ordinance failed strict scrutiny and was not 
narrowly tailored, but the ordinance's viewpoint-based restriction was treated as 
if it automatically violated the First Amendment. 
175. BaIt. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 356 F. Supp. 2d 577, 579 (D.Md. 2005), ajJ'd, 437 F.3d 
410 (4th Cir. 2006). 
176. See Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906 (D.Haw. 1974) (defining City Mayor's 
demand for objectivity from a reporter as requiring that that reporter pass "a 
subjective compatibility-accuracy test" with the Mayor (emphasis added)). 
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biased reporting to another. 177 Some scholars of journalism have 
noted that true objectivity~ in reporting is an impossible feat, and it 
is only an ideal that reporters should strive towards. 178 
Professor John C. Merrill explains that objectivity is impossible 
in journalism because a necessity of reporting is selection-
selection of "which facts are reported, which quotations are used, 
which individuals are used, which viewpoints are presented, which 
aspects are shown.,,179 Professor Merrill explains a reporter's 
"selection of what to put in a story automatically subjectivizes [the 
report], in a sense biasing and distorting the reality that the reporter 
is claiming to objectify in the report." 180 As a result, "it is 
impossible for journalism to reflect the whole of reality; it is 
always the result of choice or selection. . .. [N]ews is always 
different from the reality it reports." 181 
Thus, based on Professor Merrill's theory, regardless of how 
objective David Nitkin attempts to be in his reporting, so long as 
he is selecting certain facts over others or is approaching certain 
individuals for quotes over others, Nitkin's articles ultimately 
portray his subjective perception of the event that is being 
reported. David Nitkin's subjective perception of certain events is 
what Governor Ehrlich takes issue with; Nitkin's subjective 
perception of certain events conflict with Governor Ehrlich's 
subjective perception of those events. When the Governor reads 
Nitkin's articles, he immediately identifies facts or quotes that, to 
him, are false or misleading, and he thinks of facts or quotes that 
were omitted but should have been included. Such conflicts of 
perception are inevitable because, as one writer explains, "every 
person perceives things differently based on his own imperfect 
senses.,,182 Therefore, when Governor Ehrlich labels Nitkin's 
reporting as biased or non-objective, the Governor is challenging 
Nitkin's subjective perception of certain events---or, in other 
177. See generally Gilles Gauthier, In Defence of a Supposedly Outdated Notion: The 
Range of Application of Journalistic Objectivity, 18 CAN. J. COMM. 497, 501 
(1993), available at http://www.cjc-
online.ca/viewarticle.php?id=20 I &Iayout=html (explaining the challenges that 
have been made against objectivity in journalism based upon the "necessity of 
selection in journalism"). 
178. See generally id. at 497-99 (explaining objectivity is impossible in specific areas 
of journalism but possible in others, and advocating for objectivity in journalism 
where it is possible). 
179. Id. at 50 I (describing theory of Professor John C. Merrill). 
180. John C. Merrill, Semantics and Objectivity, in RALPH L. LOWENSTEIN & JOHN C. 
MERRILL, MACROMEDIA: MISSION, MESSAGE, AND MORALITY 272 (Gordon T. R. 
Anderson ed., 1990). 
181. See Gauthier, supra note 177, at 502 (describing theory of Professor John C. 
Merrill). 
182. Lisa Donnici, The Irony of Journalism, THE COLLEGIAN, March 31, 2004, 
available at http://www.mobap.eduistudentiCollegian (search "The Irony of 
Journalism"). 
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words, Nitkin's viewpoint. The Governor's definition of 
"objectivity," in reality, is his own subjective perception of events, 
or viewpoint, and the Governor demands that his own viewpoint 
prevail over Nitkin's. The Governor's ban is thus viewpoint-
based. 
In failing to acknowledge that the Governor's ban is viewpoint-
based, the District Court and Fourth Circuit overlooked authority 
from other jurisdictions where courts struck down viewpoint-based 
restrictions on the dissemination of government information to the 
press. 183 
c. Authority on Viewpoint-Based Restrictions on the 
Dissemination of Government Information 
Several courts have held that government cannot make 
viewpoint-based distinctions in its release of information because 
such distinctions pose a risk of chilling speech. 184 For example, in 
Chicago Reader v. Sheahan,185 reporter Tori Marlan was denied 
access to a prison program after writing an article that criticized 
prison strip search policies. 186 After the strip search article was 
printed, Marlan sought access to a prison program called Chicago 
Legal Aid for Incarcerated Mothers (CLAIM), which involved a 
classroom component. 187 Although the CLAIM classes were 
closed to the general public, accredited press members, including 
Marlan, were routinely admitted prior to her strip search article. 188 
After denying Madan access to the CLAIM classes, prison 
officials offered Marlan alternative sources of information, 
183. See infra notes 184-200 and accompanying text. 
184. See, e.g., United Teachers of Dade v. Stierheim, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1372 
(2002) (holding government policy that prohibited labor union publications from 
using general press room violated the First Amendment). Courts have struggled 
with defining the correct legal standard to apply to disputes between the press and 
government over dissemination of government information. Courts have held in 
favor of reporters on the basis of Equal Protection. See McCoy v. Providence 
Journal Co., 190 F.2d 760 (1st Cir. 1951); Quad-City Cmty. News Servo V. 
Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.Iowa 1971). Courts have also held content-based 
restrictions on dissemination of information violate the First Amendment. See 
Sherrill V. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Times-Picayune Publ'g Corp. 
V. Lee, No. 88-1325, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3506, *23-29 (E.D.La. 1988); 
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 
18 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 515 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
Some courts have held the First Amendment provides a right of equal access 
among reporters to government information. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986); Am. Broad. Co. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1977); 
Westinghouse Broad. Co. v. Dukakis, 409 F. Supp. 895 (D.Mass. 1976); Sw. 
Newspapers Corp. v. Curtis, 584 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). 
185. 141 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D. III. 2001). 
186. ld. at 1143. 
187. ld. 
188. !d. 
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including answering her questions by telephone, an attendee list so 
Marian could interview CLAIM participants on her own, and a 
videotape of the classes. 189 Prison officials admitted that "another 
reporter would have been permitted to attend the CLAIM class as a 
matter of course[,] [a]nd that Marian would have been granted 
access but for her article." 190 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
Judge Moran, held that the prison policy violated MarIan's First 
Amendment rights. 191 The court found that the prison policy could 
"chill someone's speech[,]" because "[a] reporter might well tone 
down a critical article if she feared that jail officials might 
terminate, or even restrict, her future access."I92 The court 
explained the prison had no legal obligation to admit Marian to the 
CLAIM classes, but held that "it may not refuse to do so because 
[Marian] exercised her First Amendment rights[,]" and noted that 
"denial of even discretionary perquisites, if motivated by plaintiff s 
views, violates the First Amendment.,,193 
Another case with a fact pattern similar to The Sun case is 
Borreca v. Fasi. 194 In Borreca, the Mayor of Honolulu, Frank 
Fasi, considered the reporting of reporter, Richard Borreca, to be 
"irresponsible, inaccurate, biased, and malicious.,,195 Mayor Fasi 
ordered his staff to "keep Borreca out of the mayor's office," 
including general news conferences held at the Mayor's office. 196 
After Borreca was denied access to two news conferences, Mayor 
Fasi informed the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, the newspaper for which 
Borreca reported, that Borreca was no longer welcome at the 
Mayor's news conferences, but that "any other reporter from [the 
Honolulu Star-Bulletin] would be welcome." 197 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 1146. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. Ultimately, the court held the prison policy was content-based and not 
viewpoint-based, but the court held the content-based policy violated the First 
Amendment nonetheless. See id. at 1146 (accepting defendant-prison's version 
of the facts that MarIan was denied access not because Marian criticized the 
prison, but because she misled prison officials when reporting on her strip search 
article and holding that this constituted a content-based decision). 
194. 369 F. Supp. 906 (D.Haw. 1974). 
195. Id. at 907. 
196. Id. at 907-08. These news conferences were open to "all media generally." Id. at 
907. 
197. Id. at 907-08. Interestingly, in his original complaint against Mayor Fasi, 
Borreca alleged "Mayor Fasi had instructed other city officials not to talk to 
Borecca," and Borreca had requested an injunction against this order. Id. at 908. 
Shortly after Borreca's complaint was filed, "Mayor Fasi issued [a directive] ... 
making it clear that it was his personal policy not to deal with Borreca and that 
each city department head was free to exercise his own discretion in this 
regard[;]" and Borreca subsequently dismissed this part of the complaint. Id. 
Mayor Fasi's policy, therefore, was the reverse of Governor Ehrlich's ban: where 
2006) A Poisoned Arrow in His Quiver 161 
Although the court's legal analysis in Barreca is somewhat 
flawed, 198 the court ultimately concluded Mayor Fasi's policy was 
viewpoint-based and struck it down. 199 The court explained: 
Requiring a newspaper's reporter to pass a 
subjective compatibility-accuracy test as a condition 
precedent to the right of that reporter to gather news 
is no different in kind from requiring a newspaper 
to submit its proposed news stories for editing as a 
condition precedent to the right of that newspaper to 
have a reporter cover the news. Each is a form of 
censorship. 200 
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of viewpoint-based 
restrictions on the dissemination of government information only 
in dictum. In United Reporting, the statute at issue was a 
California statute that authorized the Los Angeles Police 
Department to release arrestee address information to the public, 
but not to persons or entities seeking to use the information for 
commercial purposes. 201 The Court held the statute did not violate 
the First Amendment. 202 The Court explained the statute was 
"nothing more than a governmental denial of access to information 
in its possession[,]" and that "California could decide not to give 
out arrestee information at all without violating the First 
Amendment. ,,203 
Mayor Fasi's policy excluded Borreca from news conferences, Governor 
Ehrlich's ban permits Nitkin and Olesker to attend; and where Mayor Fasi's 
policy permitted other city hall officials to speak to Borreca, Governor Ehrlich's 
ban prohibits all executive branch staff and officials from speaking to Nitkin and 
Olesker. See Bait. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 437 F.3d 410, 413-14 (4th Cir. 2006); 
Barreca, 369 F. Supp. at 908. 
198. The court explains: "[The] First Amendment freedom of the press includes a 
limited right of reasonable access to news" and that "[t]his right of access 
includes a right of access to the public galleries, the press rooms, and the press 
conferences dealing with govemment." See Barreca, 369 F. Supp. at 908-09. 
Such an analysis conflicts with Supreme Court precedent that there is no right of 
access to government information under the First Amendment. See L.A. Police 
Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999) (holding that a 
government entity "could decide not to give out [government] ... information at 
all without violating the First Amendment"). 
199. See Barreca, 369 F. Supp. at 910 (explaining Mayor Fasi's policy was "an 
attempt to use the powers of govemmental office to intimidate or to discipline the 
press ... because of what appears in print"). 
200. /d. at 909-10. 
201. United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 32. The plaintiff in United Reporting, United 
Reporting Publishing Corporation, sought arrestee address information for 
commercial purposes, and it challenged the California statute as posing an 
impermissible burden on commercial speech. [d. at 36-37. 
202. [d. at 40. 
203. [d. Here, the Court cites Houchins, thus finally adopting the plurality opinion of 
that case. See id. 
162 Baltimore Law Review (Vol. 36 
In dictum in United Reporting, eight out of the nine Justices 
agreed that government cannot make viewfc0int-based distinctions 
in its release of information to the public. 04 In her concurrence, 
Justice Ginsburg explained that the pro,:,ision of arrestee address 
information is "a kind of subsidy" to people who wish to use such 
information for speech purposes.205 She explained: "[O]nce a 
state decides to make such a benefit available to the public, there 
are no doubt limits to its freedom to decide how that benefit will be 
distributed[;] [and that] the award of the subsidy [cannot be] 
based on an illegitimate criterion such as viewpoint.,,206 
2. The Fourth Circuit Did Not Evaluate the Governor's Ban as 
Broad Overarching Policy 
The fundamental problem of the Fourth Circuit's opinion is the 
court's inability to see the distinction between the hypothetical 
scenano of "a public official's selective preferential 
communication to his favorite reporter or reporters,,207 and 
Governor Ehrlich's conduct, which was to command the entire 
Executive Department to not communicate with Nitkin and 
204. See id. at 43 (Ginsburg, 1., concurring); id. at 42 (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing 
with Justice Ginsburg, impliedly, that viewpoint-based restrictions on 
dissemination of government information violate the First Amendment); id. at 46 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Ginsburg that viewpoint-based 
restrictions on dissemination of government information violate the First 
Amendment). 
205. Id. at 43 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
206. Id. (emphasis added). The rule Justice Ginsburg applies here is the same rule the 
Supreme Court applies whenever it analyzes government funding schemes under 
the First Amendment. See id. (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representation of 
Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983)). The Court has acknowledged that in granting 
subsidies for speech, government can "indirectly abridge speech . . . if the 
funding scheme is manipulated to have a coercive effect" on those seeking the 
government subsidy. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 552 (2001) 
(emphasis removed) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Although there is no constitutional "right" to receive a government subsidy or 
benefit, and the government may deny subsidies to persons for "any number of 
reasons," Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972), the Court has 
recognized: "[T]here are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. 
[Government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests----especially, his interest in freedom of 
speech." Id. at 597. The Court has held that where the denial of a government 
benefit "threatens 'to drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace,'" 
Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Nat 'I Endowment/or 
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998)), or is "the product of invidious 
viewpoint discrimination," Finley, 524 U.S. at 587, the First Amendment is 
violated. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 548 (explaining First Amendment issues would 
arise concerning a federal statute denying tax exemption for lobbying activities of 
general charities "if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in 
such a way as to '[aim] at the suppression of dangerous ideas.'" (quoting 
Cammarano v. U.S., 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)). 
207. Balt. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 437 F.3d 410,418 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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Olesker. The court described the two scenarios as "materially 
indistinguishable," and explained: 
Both [scenarios] ... are merely two different ways 
of describing the same pervasive and everyday 
relationship between government officials and the 
press .. " Both the hypothetical and the facts of this 
case present instances in which government 
officials disadvantage some reporters because of 
their reporting and simultaneously advantage others 
by granting them unequal access to nonpublic 
information. Thus, whether the disfavored reporters 
number two or two million, they are still denied 
access to discretionarily afforded information on 
account of their reporting. The facts of this case 
and the hypothetical stand or fall together .... 208 
In other words, the court's logic is that because it is generally 
accepted that public officials can refuse to speak to certain 
reporters based upon what those reporters have written in the past, 
government can therefore create broad viewpoint-based policies 
that discriminate against reporters in granting them access to 
communicate with public officials. 
The court takes quite a leap in holding the Governor's ban must 
be upheld for the same reasons that any public official's refusal to 
speak to a reporter must be upheld. In taking this leap, the court 
overlooks some important distinctions between its hypothetical 
scenario and the facts of The Sun case. The first distinction is that 
while the First Amendment protects a public official's decision to 
not speak,209 no such protection is afforded to the Governor's ban. 
Although the ban implicitly communicates Governor Ehrlich's 
dislike of the two reporters, that communication is not what the 
reporters were challenging. The reporters were challenging the 
ban itself-i.e. Governor Ehrlich's command to the Executive 
Department that no one is allowed to communicate with the two 
reporters. The ban itself is not an exercise of Governor Ehrlich's 
208. [d. 
209. Freedom of speech under the First Amendment includes the right to speak and to 
not speak when one chooses. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & 
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) ("[O]ne important 
manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak 
may also decide what not to say .... " (internal quotations marks omitted)); 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("[T]he right of freedom of 
thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the 
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at aiL"). Government 
officials and employees "retain their personal rights [under the First Amendment] 
to engage in freedom of speech and association." MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN 
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN 
AMERICA 172 (1983). 
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First Amendment right of free expression. The Governor's ban is 
an exercise of state power. That the First Amendment was 
intended to protect the Governor's exercise of such power is an 
untenable argument. 210 
The most important distinction between the court's hypothetical 
scenario of a public official selectively choosing to communicate 
with favored reporters and The Sun case is the level of 
disadvantage created for reporters in either scenario. The 
disadvantage created by Governor Ehrlich forbidding the entire 
Executive Department from speaking to Nitkin and Olesker is 
substantially greater than the disadvantage created by one public 
official refusing to speak to either reporter. The Governor created 
broad overarching policy by commanding the Executive 
Department to stop communicating with Nitkin and Olesker. No 
such policy is created when one public official refuses to speak to 
either reporter. The disadvantage created by the broad overarching 
policy of the Governor's ban is sufficient to chill a reasonable 
reporter's speech, whereas, one public official's refusal to speak to 
a reporter is a de minimis inconvenience, and thus, insufficient to 
chill a reasonable reporter's speech. 
The Fourth Circuit itself noted that "reporting is highly 
competitive, and reporters cultivate access-sometimes exclusive 
access-to sources, including government officials.,,211 The 
importance of a government reporter "cultivating access" to public 
officials is fairly obvious: public officials provide insider 
information about government; insider information ultimately 
leads to the "scoop;" and newspapers that get the scoop sell the 
most copies. Thus, reporters that have the greatest access to public 
officials are more likely to get the scoop, and reporters with greater 
access to public officials ultimately are more valuable to 
newspapers than reporters with lesser access. 
There is evidence that David Nitkin, as the Baltimore Sun's 
State House Bureau Chief, had "cultivated access" to public 
officials in the Executive Department prior to the Governor's 
ban. 212 These relationships were destroyed by the Governor's ban, 
and the ban has eliminated Nitkin' s ability to cultivate new sources 
of information within the Executive Department. While before the 
Governor's ban was implemented, Nitkin could, in the court's 
210. "The First Amendment has been viewed historically as involving limitations on 
government, not as a source of government rights. Constitutional rights like 
those embodied in the Bill of Rights have not been extended to government 
bodies . ... " YUDOF, supra note 209, at 44 (emphasis added). 
211. Bait. Sun,437F.3dat417. 
212. Bait. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 356 F. Supp. 2d 577,579 (D.Md. 2005), affd, 437 F.3d 
410 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that before the ban was implemented, there were state 
employees in the Governor's Office and agencies who regularly spoke to Nitkin). 
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words, "curry[] [his] sources' favors" in order to get interviews or 
quotes from public officials,213 no such options remain for Nitkin 
as a result of the ban. Where before the Governor's ban was 
implemented, Nitkin could pick up a telephone to contact 
Executive Department officials or employees to obtain 
information, now he is entirely dependent on third-parties to do 
such research. 214 . 
Although the distinction between speaking to a public official 
directly and having someone else speak for you may seem trivial, 
such complications eat up a reporter's time. Time is of the essence 
for reporters considering today's 24-hour news cycle and the 
perpetual deadlines that reporters face. Where a reporter's job is to 
cover state government, policies like the Governor's ban obstruct a 
reporter from being able to do his job. While reporters who are not 
included under the Governor's ban can work independently of 
other reporters, David Nitkin cannot write his articles without the 
help of other reporters. It is not entirely unlikely that other Sun 
reporters who are unburdened by the Governor's ban can now do a 
better job of reporting on the State House than David Nitkin. 
The Fourth Circuit offers no explanation for how, after first 
noting the competitive nature of reporting and explaining that 
reporters routinely cultivate access to public officials as sources of 
information, it can then hold a ban that eliminates two reporters' 
ability to cultivate access with an entire branch of government 
poses a de minimis inconvenience. The fact that reporting is very 
competitive and that reporters rely on public officials as sources of 
information is the precise reason why forbidding an entire branch 
of government from speaking to two reporters on account of their 
viewpoint is likely to chill the expression of the viewpoint that is 
disfavored under the government ban. 21S 
Although the Fourth Circuit came to a different conclusion 
concerning the potential chilling effect of the Governor's ban, the 
213. Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d at 419. 
214. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
215. The court noted that during the eight weeks before the Governor's ban was 
implemented, Nitkin wrote 45 articles related to state government, and during the 
eight weeks after the ban, Nitkin wrote 43 articles. Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d at 415. 
The court pointed to this as evidence that Nitkin has "not been chilled to any 
substantial degree in [his] reporting." !d. at 419. The court also noted that at oral 
argument, the Baltimore Sun could not answer the question of whether it was in 
fact chilled in its speech. Id. at 419 n.l. While it is puzzling that the Baltimore 
Sun was unable to answer the question at oral argument of whether it was chilled 
in its speech, the court's reliance on the sheer number of articles written by 
Nitkin after the ban was implemented seems to be a cursory approach to 
evaluating whether Nitkin's speech was in fact chilled. The number of articles 
written by Nitkin after the Governor's ban was implemented provides no 
information about whether the viewpoint expressed in Nitkin's reporting has 
changed as a result of the ban. 
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court did not evaluate the Governor's ban as overarching policy. 
Instead, the court evaluated the Governor's ban by looking at 
individual instances of a public official refusing to speak to a 
reporter. 216 By only looking at the "trees" of the Governor's ban, 
the court failed to appreciate the "forest" that is the overarching 
policy of the ban. As a result, the Fourth Circuit's evaluation of 
the Governor's ban is flawed. When the Governor's ban is 
properly evaluated as broad overarching viewpoint-based policy, 
its potential to chill a reasonable reporter's speech becomes 
apparent. 
C. Conclusion 
The U.S. District Court and the Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Sun 
v. Ehrlich were correct in holding the First Amendment guarantees 
no general right of access to government information. Each court, 
however, failed to acknowledge that the Governor's ban is 
viewpoint-based, and neither court evaluated the ban for what it 
is-broad overarching policy. As a result, neither court 
appreciated the potential chilling effect of the Governor's ban. In 
upholding the ban, the courts created a dangerous precedent. 
In the next section, this Comment defines a workable 
framework for evaluating how government disseminates 
information to the press. The purpose of this framework is to 
disprove the Fourth Circuit's contention that striking down the 
Governor's ban would "plant the seed of a constitutional case in 
virtuall~ every interchange between public official[ s] and 
press." 17 This framework also is meant to provide a resource for 
other courts when evaluating disputes between government and the 
press over the government's dissemination of information. 
216. For example, when the court begins its analysis of the Governor's ban, it notes: 
"It would be inconsistent with the journalist's accepted role in the 'rough and 
tumble' political arena to accept that a reporter of ordinary firmness can be 
chilled by a politician's refusal to comment or answer questions on account of the 
reporter's previous reporting." Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d at 419 (emphasis added). 
Later, the court describes the ban as if it is merely a denial of access to Governor 
Ehrlich: "While Nitkin and Olesker might now be disfavored, they are no more 
disfavored than the many reporters without access to the Governor." ld. at 420 
(emphasis added). Then, finally, the court holds: "[A] reporter endures only de 
minimis inconvenience when a government official denies the reporter access to 
discretionary information or refuses to answer the reporter's questions .... " ld. 
(second emphasis added). 
217. Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d at 418 (internal quotations omitted). 
2006] A Poisoned Arrow in His Quiver 167 
IV. FRAMEWORK 
A. Introduction 
A workable First Amendment framework for detennining what 
government can and cannot do when disseminating infonnation to 
the press can be defined as follows: broad overarching viewpoint-
based government policies on the dissemination of government 
infonnation constitute restrictions on speech, and should be struck 
down in almost all situations. 
The element within this framework that distinguishes the 
scenario of one public official refusing to speak to a reporter from 
the Governor's ban is "policy." To constitute "policy" under this 
framework, a government restriction on the release of government 
infonnation must be so expansive and create such a disadvantage 
that it will chill a reasonable reporter's speech. The distinction 
between policy and non-policy is the level of disadvantage or 
burden created by a particular restriction on the release of 
government infonnation. An individual's decision to not speak to 
a reporter is not policy. 
"Government infonnation" is broadly defined under this 
framework, and includes government infonnation and statistics, 
access to public facilities, and ideas, opinions and views from 
public officials. This framework only applies to viewpoint-based 
policy, and not content-based policies that are viewpoint-
neutral. 218 
218. In United Reporting, the Supreme Court was divided over the issue of whether 
content-based restrictions on the dissemination of government-held information 
constitute restrictions on speech. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia defined 
content-based restrictions on the release of government information as 
"restriction[s] upon speech rather than upon access to government information." 
L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 42 (1999) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). In Justice Scalia's view, such restrictions therefore 
deserve some level of First Amendment scrutiny. See id. (explaining that what 
"renders [the California] statute immune from a facial challenge [does not] 
necessarily render[] it immune from an as-applied challenge," thus implying that 
under an as-applied challenge, some level of scrutiny should be applied to the 
content-based statute). Justice Ginsburg, in contrast, thinks government should 
be allowed to make content-based distinctions in its release of information. See 
id. at 43 (Ginsburg, J, concurring). She explains that if states were forced to 
choose between keeping information to themselves and releasing it without 
limits, "states might well choose the former" and such a rule "would lead not to 
more speech overall but to more secrecy and less speech." [d. Although content-
based restrictions on government's release of information are tangential to the 
issue discussed in this Comment, one suggestion for analyzing content-based 
restrictions on government's release of information is to apply a lesser standard 
than strict scrutiny, such as the "reasonableness" standard that is applied to 
restrictions on speech in nonpublic forums. See supra note 149 and 
accompanying text. 
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In order to illustrate how this framework works, first it will be 
applied to The Sun case. After discussing The Sun case, this 
Comment applies the framework to other hypothetical scenarios. 
B. The Sun case 
The Governor's ban is facially viewpoint-based because of its 
stated rationale that Olesker and Nitkin were "failing to objectively 
report" on the Ehrlich administration. 219 The government 
information at issue in The Sun case is ideas, opinions and views 
from public officials in the Executive Department. This 
information is being released to other reporters, but not Olesker 
and Nitkin as a result of the Governor's ban. 22o The Governor's 
ban applies to all employees and officials within the Executive 
Department. Under the ban, the targeted reporters cannot obtain 
information from Executive Department officials or employees 
without the help of third-parties. The ban is broad enough to 
create a substantial disadvantage for the two reporters, and 
therefore, it constitutes policy.221 Th~ effect of this policy is to 
chill speech. 222 As a result, the Governor's ban constitutes a 
restriction on speech and it violates the First Amendment. 
C. Hypo th etica Is 
1. Interviews with Public Officials; Press Conferences 
Excluding one reporter from an exclusive interview with the 
Governor is not broad enough and it does not create enough of a 
disadvantage for the excluded reporter to constitute policy. Such 
conduct creates a minimal disadvantage for a reporter because all 
other reporters, with the exception of the one who was granted the 
exclusive interview, also are denied access to the Governor. 
Because this conduct does not constitute policy, it does not deserve 
scrutiny under this framework. As a result, the routine practice of 
public officials granting interviews to reporters with favorable 
viewpoints can continue unabated under this framework. 223 
Excluding one reporter from a small gathering of about five to 
ten reporters in the Governor's office also is not broad enough and 
219. See supra notes 175-183 and accompanying text. 
220. Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d at 414. 
221. See supra notes 211-215 and accompanying text. 
222 Complaint, supra note 24, at 'Il 26 ("The [Governor's] policy was intended to 
have and has had an impermissible chilling effect on The Sun's right to free 
expression." (emphasis added)). 
223. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted: "It would 
certainly be linreasonable to suggest that because the President [of the United 
States] allows interviews with some bona fide journalists, he must give this 
opportunity to all." Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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does not create enough of a disadvantage for the excluded reporter 
to constitute policy. The disadvantage created in this situation is 
still minimal because, although several reporters are receiving 
favorable treatment, the majority of reporters are still being denied 
access to the Governor. 224 
Excluding one reporter from a press conference open to all 
other reporters is broad enough and creates a sufficient 
disadvantage for that reporter to constitute policy. 225 The 
disadvantage created in this situation is significant because the 
excluded reporter is being denied access to information that all 
other reporters are receiving. The next issue is whether the 
reporter is being excluded from the press conference on account of 
his or her viewpoint. If so, the reporter's First Amendment rights 
are violated. If the reporter is being excluded for some reason 
other than his or her viewpoint, then they have no claim under this 
framework,226 but courts should, of course, beware of justifications 
that are mere pretext for viewpoint discrimination. 
2. Bans Imposed on Divisions/Agencies within the Executive 
Department 
In evaluating a ban that applies to one division or agency within 
the Executive Department, courts should take into consideration 
the extent to which that division or agency regularly interacts with 
the media. For example, the Governor's press division obviously 
deals extensively with the media. Banning the entire press division 
from speaking to a reporter likely creates a sufficient disadvantage 
for that excluded reporter to constitute policy. This is because the 
excluded reporter is being denied information that all other 
reporters can access on a daily basis. If such policy is viewpoint-
based, it should be struck down under this framework. 
In contrast, an agency such as the Department of Corrections 
does not regularly interact with the media. As a result, placing a 
ban on the Department of Corrections from speaking to a particular 
reporter does not create a sufficient disadvantage for that reporter 
to constitute policy. Although the Department of Corrections ban 
may apply to a larger number of state employees than the press 
224. Alaska Governor Frank Murkowski has implemented a policy where, instead of 
holding press conferences, he selectively chooses several reporters to meet with 
at a time. See Jennifer Myers, Clamping Down, 29 NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW 20 
(2005). 
225. Cf Sherrill, 569 F.2d at 129 ("[Denying] a White House press pass is violative of 
the [F]irst [A]mendment ... if it is based upon the content of the journalist'S 
speech or otherwise discriminates against a class of protected speech."). 
226. Cf id. at 130 (holding security concerns were a legitimate reason to deny a White 
House press pass to a reporter with a history of violent behavior). 
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division ban, the Department of Corrections ban still poses a 
minimal disadvantage for the excluded reporter because the 
majority of Corrections employees do not regularly interact with 
the media, and would not do so even if the ban were not in place. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. District Court and Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Sun v. 
Ehrlich failed to properly define Governor Ehrlich's ban as 
viewpoint-based policy. As a result, the courts did not properly 
evaluate the level of disadvantage that the Governor's ban creates 
for David Nitkin and Michael Olesker, and they underestimated the 
potential chilling effect of the ban. The framework discussed in 
this Comment illustrates that Governor Ehrlich's conduct in 
creating broad overarching viewpoint-based policy can be 
distinguished from other scenarios, such as one public official 
refusing to speak to a reporter, which pose a de minimis 
inconvenience for reporters. 
Governor Ehrlich is wrong when he says that banning his 
Executive Department from communicating with reporters is his 
"only arrow" in responding to so-called biased reporting. The 
Governor is the most powerful government official in the State of 
Maryland. He is in the public spotlight at all times. His mere 
presence in any public setting commands public attention. The 
Governor's ability to attract public attention is far greater than that 
of any reporter at the Baltimore Sun. The Governor's most 
powerful "arrow" in responding to attacks by the media is his 
power to command public attention. By exercising this power, the 
Governor can speak out against unfair reporting, and he can 
identify inaccuracies and explain why particular stories are 
misleading. What the Governor cannot do is create broad 
overarching viewpoint-based policies that suppress unfavorable 
reporting. Such action strikes at the very heart of the First 
Amendment. 
Joseph S. Johnston 
